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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
James E. Ryan, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article addresses significant developments in Virginia law
pertaining to air and water pollution, solid and hazardous waste,
and environmentally sensitive areas which have occurred between
the publication of last year's survey1 and August 1, 1990.
II. AIR
A. Legislation
The 1990 General Assembly passed legislation continuing the
Department of Air Pollution Control ("DAPC") as an agency
within the Secretariat of Natural Resources.- The legislation enu-
merated the powers, duties and responsibilities of the Department
and the Executive Director.' Also, the General Assembly required
an applicant for a permit for a new or stationary air pollution
source to provide DAPC with notification from the governing body
of the county, city or town in which the source is to be located that
the location and source are consistent with local planning and zon-
ing ordinances.'
B. Administrative Proceedings
The State Air Pollution Control Board (SAPCB) has proposed
new regulations establishing an operating permit for new and ex-
isting sources. The SAPCB is also in the process of revising its
* Partner, Mays & Valentine, Richmond, Virginia; B.Ch.E., 1968, University of Virginia;
J.D., 1971, Columbus School of Law, Catholic University of America. The author gratefully
acknowleges the assistance of Heidi W. Abbott, Charles K. Grant, Eric R. Stahlfeld, and
Harold E. Greer.
1. Kingsley, Environmental Law: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 23 U. RICH. L. REv. 625
(1989).
2. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1307.1 (Cur. Supp. 1990).
3. Id. § 10.1-1307.2.
4. Id. § 10.1-1321.1.
5. 5:21 Va. Regs. Reg. 3173 (1989).
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non-criteria (toxic) pollutant regulations.'
III. SOLID AND HAZARDOUS WASTE
A. Legislation
The General Assembly significantly increased the regulation of
non-hazardous solid waste facilities, which may not be operated
without a permit from the Director of the Department of Waste
Management ("DWM"). 7 The permit application must now dis-
close important information8 on any person employed in a manage-
rial capacity or empowered to make discretionary decisions.9 An
applicant must update this disclosure statement quarterly while
his application is pending. Every current permit holder must file a
disclosure statement by July 1, 1991.10
Permits may be revoked if a violation is representative of a pat-
tern of serious or repeated violations, or if any key personnel have
been adjudged in violation of environmental protection laws of the
United States or any state and such violation or conviction is suffi-
ciently probative of an inability or unwillingness to operate the fa-
cility in a lawful manner.11 Permits may also be revoked as a result
of changes in key personnel, or if the applicant knowingly misrep-
resented a material fact in his disclosure statement.12
The civil penalty for each day of violation of any hazardous or
solid waste statute, regulation, permit condition or order has been
increased to $25,000.13 If the violation involves hazardous waste
and is knowing, the penalties have been increased even more. For a
knowing violation involving hazardous waste, the violator is guilty
of a felony punishable by a minimum imprisonment of one year
6. Id. at 3172.
7. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1408.1 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
8. This information must include the full name, business address, social security number,
a description of the business experience, relevant permits held within the past ten years,
any notices of any violations of any relevant regulations within the past ten years which are
pending or have concluded with a finding of violation or consent agreement, all convictions
within ten years of enumerated felonies, and any other information that the Director may
require that "reasonably relates to the [individual's] qualifications and ability . . . to law-
fully and competently operate a solid waste management facility." Id. § 10.1-1400.
9. These persons are called "key personnel." Id.
10. Id. § 10.1-1408.1(c)(1). The provision does not expressly require that each current
permit holder also must update its disclosure statement quarterly.
11. Id. § 10.1-1409.
12. Id. § 10.1-1409(7), (8).
13. Id. § 10.1-1455(A).
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and a maximum of five, a fine of $25,000, either or both.14 If the
violation involves hazardous waste and the violator knows that he
places another in imminent danger of death or serious bodily in-
jury, he is guilty of a felony punishable by a minimum imprison-
ment of two years and a maximum of fifteen, a fine of not more
than $250,000, either or both.15 For any subsequent conviction the
maximum penalties are doubled."6 For a defendant that is not an
individual, the maximum fine is the greater of $1,000,000 or three
times the economic benefit realized as a result of the offense.1 7
The General Assembly made two other changes to make it easier
to bring an action against a polluter. First, it defined "nuisance" to
include "dangerous or unhealthy substances which have escaped,
spilled, been released or which have been allowed to accumulate in
or on any place," and permitted any local government to compel a
responsible party to abate a public nuisance. 8 Secondly, the Gen-
eral Assembly created an action for "improper disposal of solid
waste." The landowner or, if the waste is improperly disposed of
upon land owned by the Commonwealth, any resident, may bring
the action. 9
The General Assembly created a defense which protects a de-
fendant from liability for cleanup of sites contaminated by solid or
hazardous waste where the damage was caused by an unrelated
third party and the defendant can show that he exercised due care
and took precautions against foreseeable acts of any such third
party.20
In an effort to reduce problems associated with solid waste dis-
posal, the General Assembly adopted several measures promoting
recycling. The DWM must expedite applications for permits to ac-
cept a newly created category of solid waste, recycling residue,
which includes the waste remaining after removing metal from
14. Id. § 10.1-1455(B).
15. Id.
16. Id. § 10.1-1455(H).
17. Id.
18. Id. § 15.1-29.21 (Supp. 1990). Furthermore, if the nuisance "presents an imminent
and immediate threat to life or property" the local government may abate and bring an
action against the responsible party to recover costs. Id.
19. Id. § 10.1-1418.1. The act creates a rebuttable presumption that the defendant im-
properly disposed of the waste if the plaintiff establishes by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the defendant had possessed the waste and had not been given permission to
dispose of the waste on the property.
20. Id. § 10.1-1406.
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solid waste or after the production of a refuse derived fuel.2 This
recycling residue will count toward the recycling targets estab-
lished by the regional waste management plans developed under
section 10.1-1411 of the Code of Virginia (the "Code"). 22 The
Board of Waste Management ("BWM") must also encourage yard
waste composting facilities by allowing reasonable exemptions
from permitting requirements,23 and local jurisdictions may pro-
hibit the disposal of leaves or grass clippings in any landfill if the
composting program is capable of handling them. 24 Local jurisdic-
tions may require certain types of solid waste to be disposed of in
authorized facilities,25 businesses to separate waste by type for re-
cycling,26 and, to facilitate the regional waste management plans,
may require solid waste generators to report annually information
regarding recycling.27
The General Assembly directed the DWM to grant exemptions
from the minimum recycling rates specified in the regional waste
management plans when market conditions make such rates unrea-
sonable.2 8 Each state agency and university must establish a re-
cycling program.29 Lead and batteries may be disposed of only in
authorized recycling facilities.30
B. Administrative Proceedings
The DWM's regulations for the development of regional solid
waste management plans became effective May 15, 1990."' The
purpose of these regulations is to ensure that each region, and each
city, town and county not part of such a region develop compre-
hensive and integrated plans for the management of solid waste..2
These plans must consider the following hierarchy: 1) source re-
duction, 2) rescue, 3) recycling, 4) resource recovery (waste to en-
21. Id. §9 10.1-1400, -1408.1.
22. Id. § 10.1-1411.
23. Id. § 10.1-1408.1.
24. Id. § 15.1-11.5.1 (Supp. 1990).
25. Id. § 15.1-11.
26. Id. § 15.1-11.5.
27. Id. § 15.1-11.5:2.
28. Id. § 10.1-1411.
29. Id. § 10.1-1425.6.
30. Id. § 10.1-1425.1.
31. 6:14 Va. Regs. Reg. 2140 (1990).
32. Id. at 2143-44, § 2.3(1).
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ergy), 5) incineration, 6) landfilling, and 7) plan implementation."
The regulations designate the objectives and necessary elements
of solid waste management plans. Cities or towns can develop
plans individually, or participate in an authorized regional plan.3 4
Plans must be submitted by July 1, 1991.3' Some of the elements
to be incorporated are funding, integrated strategy, site identifica-
tion, public information and participation and waste stream analy-
sis. Mandatory goals for recycling rates and the method of calcula-
tion are also established. 8 The regulations establish procedures for
considering rule making petitions and the issuance of variances.3
After July 1, 1992, no permit for a solid waste facility will be
issued unless a local or regional application is in effect.3 When
there is a mutually exclusive conflict between the Regulations for
the Development of Solid Waste Management Plans and other
adopted nonhazardous solid waste management regulations the
former prevail. 9 Beginning July 1, 1997 and every five years there-
after, a report updating the plan must be submitted for the De-
partment's approval.4 °
On November 2, 1989, the Department adopted regulations
which became effective May 2, 199041 for the management of infec-
tious wastes. "Infectious waste" includes cultures, blood, pathologi-
cal wastes, sharps, animal carcasses, or any other solid waste capa-
ble of producing an infectious disease in humans.42 Exempt from
these regulations are those wastes which are regulated by other
agencies such as the State Board of Health or State Water Control
Board, in addition to specifically authorized waste of health care
professionals who generate waste in their office or the private home
of a patient.43 Excluded from the definition of solid or infectious
waste are (for example) domestic sewage, human remains properly
interred in a cemetery, wastes contaminated with organisms not
generally recognized as pathological to humans, and used products
33. Id. § 2.2.
34. Id. at 2145.
35. Id. § 3.1(b).
36. Id. at 2145-46, § 3.2(A)-(C).
37. Id. at 2149-50.
38. Id. at 2144, § 2.6(C).
39. Id. at 2144-45, § 2.8.
40. Id. at 2145, § 3.1(F).
41. 6:5 Va. Regs. Reg. 741 (1990).
42. Id. at 748-49, § 3.4-3.5.
43. Id. at 747-48, § 3.2.
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for personal hygiene."
A permit is required for the management of infectious wastes, 45
unless the facility qualifies for a permit-by-rule46 in which case it is
already deemed to be operating under a permit for infectious
waste. To qualify for a permit-by-rule, a facility must be in compli-
ance with all parts of the regulations except section 9.47 Seventy-
five percent of all waste that is stored, treated or disposed of by
the facility must be generated on-site; no infectious waste may be
transported or received without being properly packaged; no infec-
tious waste can be placed in the ground; and the owner/operator of
the facility must inform the Executive Director of DWM that the
facility is operating under a permit-by-rule.48
Other general requirements for the management of infectious
waste include requirements for financial assurance, 8 packaging
and labeling,50 management of spills,51 closure,52 treatment and
disposal,53 testing,54 and recordkeeping.5 These regulations also
contain special requirements for the storage,56 transportation, 57 in-
cineration, 58 and steam sterilization59 of infectious waste.
C. Judicial Activities
In the Circuit Court of Chesterfield County, the court sustained
the county's demurrer to a landfill operator's claim that the
county's attempt to close the landfill was pre-empted by state au-
thority. 0 In April 1984, the landfill operator was issued a solid
44. Id. at 748, § 3.3(A)-(C).
45. Id. at 749, § 4.1(A).
46. Id. at 749-50, § 4.1(B).
47. Id. at 757, §§ 9.1-9.23. (These are the formal permit application and issuance
procedures).
48. Id. at 749-50, § 4.1(B).
49. Id. at 750, § 4.2.
50. Id. at 750-51, § 4.3.
51. Id. at 751-52, § 4.4.
52. Id. at 752, § 4.5.
53. Id. § 4.6.
54. Id. § 4.7.
55. Id. at 752-53, § 4.8.
56. Id. at 753, §§ 5.1-5.5.
57. Id. at 753-55, §§ 6.1-6.9.
58. Id. at 755-76, §§ 7.1-7.5.
59. Id. at 756, §§ 8-1-8.3.
60. Lawless v. Board of Supervisors, No. CH89-448 (Chesterfield County Nov. 1, 1989)
(ltr. op.).
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waste management permit by the DWM to operate a debris land-
fill. Several months later, the Board of Supervisors of Chesterfield
County (the "Board") granted the operator a conditional use per-
mit authorizing a landfill on the property for a period of five years.
The conditional use permit prohibited the acceptance of certain
wastes allowed by the state permit. During an inspection of the
landfill in November 1988, the operator was found in violation of
the conditional use permit, although the landfill was within the
uses authorized by the state permit. In March 1989, the Board re-
voked the conditional use permit granted in 1984 and ordered that
all landfill activity on the property be terminated immediately."
Plaintiff argued that the Board did not have express authority to
revoke the conditional permit and, therefore, the Board's action
was in violation of Dillon's Rule 2 and ultra vires.63 Furthermore,
plaintiff alleged, the county was pre-empted by the State Waste
Management Act from issuing a conditional use permit more re-
strictive than the permit issued by the state. 4
Regarding the authority of the county to revoke the conditional
use permit, the court noted that the General Assembly granted lo-
calities and towns the authority to regulate the manner in which
solid waste facilities are operated and maintained. 5 It also noted
that section 15.1-857 of the Code grants this same power and au-
thority to each county board of supervisors.6 6 The court held that
it was "apparent from these provisions that the Waste Manage-
ment Act does not pre-empt the County from regulating land use
where solid landfills are concerned, but instead recognizes and pro-
vides for a localities [sic] authority to regulate land use."6 Thus,
the court concluded, both the DWM and local governments possess
the power to regulate solid waste facilities and when both regulate
the same subject matter, "effect should be given to both by
harmonization."68
61. Id. at 2.
62. Dillon's Rule holds that local governments have only those powers expressly conferred
by the state legislature, those necessarily and fairly implied from an express grant, and
those essential and indispensable. See Commonwealth v. Arlington County Bd., 217 Va. 558,
232 S.E.2d 30 (1977).
63. Lawless, ltr. op. at 2.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 3; see generally VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-857 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
66. Lawless, Itr. op. at 3.
67. Id. at 4.
68. Id.
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In Kim-Stan, Inc. v. Department of Waste Management,9 the
federal district court determined that it did not have jurisdiction
over a sanitary landfill operator's suit to enjoin enforcement of the
State Water Control Board's (SWCB) emergency special order that
closed a landfill after leachate discharges resulted in a fish kill. 0
The court found that abstention from jurisdiction was proper be-
cause (1) state proceedings had begun prior to substantial federal
court proceedings on the merits;71 (2) the state proceedings gave an
opportunity for federal claims to be heard; and (3) important state
interests were at stake. In addition, no bad faith exception was
demonstrated. 2
The court held that the "ongoing" state proceeding requirement
was met by the SWCB's June 6 emergency order which expressly
mandated a formal hearing.73 The court noted that SWCB's bill of
complaint filed in state court also constituted an "ongoing" state
proceeding. The court expressly rejected Kim-Stan's assertion that
the temporary restraining order issued by the federal magistrate
on June 16, 1989, constituted the commencement of a substantive
proceeding in Federal Court.74 Furthermore, the court found that
both actions by the SWCB provided Kim-Stan with the opportu-
nity to raise its federal claims in state proceedings.75
Finally, the court held that Virginia's intent to protect the
health and safety of its citizens clearly indicated that an important
state interest was at stake. The court rejected plaintiff's argument
that bad faith on the Department of Waste Management's part
made federal jurisdiction appropriate. 6
In Bryant v. Colonial Pipeline Company, the federal court, in
denying defendant's motion to dismiss, considered whether petro-
leum waste comes within the "petroleum exclusion" of the Com-
69. 732 F. Supp. 646 (E.D. Va. 1990).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 649. On June 6, 1989, in response to a fish kill, the State Water Control Board
issued an Emergency Special Order closing the landfill because of the discharge. This order
facilitated proceedings for a formal hearing. On June 23, 1989 the Commonwealth, on behalf
of the SWCB, filed a bill of complaint in the Circuit Court of Alleghany County seeking
temporary and permanent injunctions and a judgment for civil penalties against Kim-Stan.
Id. at 647-48.
72. Id. at 648-49.
73. Id. at 649.
74. Id. at 650.
75. Id. at 652.
76. Id.
77. No. 88-0208-L (W.D. Va. Aug. 7, 1989) (mem. op.).
590 [Vol. 24:583
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prehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability
Act ("CERCLA").78 Defendant, operator of a petroleum pipeline,
had deposited waste sludge at plaintiff's landfill. Plaintiffs filed a
declaratory judgment action alleging that defendants were liable
for response costs under CERCLA for cleanup of the site in ques-
tion. In its motion to dismiss, defendant asserted the petroleum
sludge was not a "hazardous substance" as defined in CERCLA.
The district court ruled that the "petroleum exclusion" does not
apply to all waste products containing petroleum.79 Instead, the
court found that the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
distinguishes between contaminated petroleum products not
within the petroleum exclusion and uncontaminated petroleum
products (within the petroleum exclusion). The EPA defines un-
contaminated petroleum as petroleum which "includes hazardous
substances normally found in refined petroleum fractions but does
not include either hazardous substances found at levels which ex-
ceed those normally found in such fractions or substances not nor-
mally found in fractions." 0 Thus, according to the court, if defend-
ants' petroleum sludge was found to contain "hazardous
substances" at levels greater than those normally occurring in pe-
troleum products, the sludge would not come within CERCLA's''petroleum exclusion." The court denied the motion to dismiss
noting that content of the petroleum sludge was a factual question
not yet resolved."'
IV. WATER
A. Legislation
The General Assembly strengthened the authority of the State
Water Control Board ("SWCB") over the Virginia Pollution Dis-
charge Elimination System ("VPDES"). The term of a VPDES
permit cannot be longer than five years, and the SWCB may re-
78. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(4) (1988). CERCLA expressly excludes from the coverage of the Act"petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not otherwise specifically
listed or designated as a hazardous substance.. ." even though petroleum products contain
constituents specifically listed as hazardous substances under CERCLA. 42 U.S.C. § 9601
(14).
79. Bryant, mem. op. at 5.
80. Id. at 6 (quoting EPA's General Counsel's Opinion of July 31, 1987, "Scope of the
CERCLA Petroleum Exclusion under Sections 101(14) and 104(a)(2)," 14 CHEM. WASTE L-
TIG. REP. 842 (1987)).
81. Bryant, mem. op. at 7.
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voke a permit for virtually any violation. 2 A court is required to
issue an injunction if the SWCB issues an emergency special order
based on a finding of "immediate and substantial danger" to all
reasonable uses of water s8 The penalties for a violation were also
increased.84 The penalty for a willful or negligent violation is a
misdemeanor punishable by up to a year in jail, a fine of between
$2,500 and $25,000, or both. 5 The penalty for a knowing violation
is a felony punishable by one to three years in jail, or up to one
year and a fine of $5,000 to $50,000.88 If a person knows that his
act places another in imminent danger of serious bodily harm, the
penalty is a felony punishable by two to fifteen years in jail, a fine
of up to $250,000, or both." The maximum penalty is doubled for
any subsequent conviction.8
For owners of underground petroleum storage tanks, the General
Assembly adopted per occurrence financial responsibility require-
ments. All owners and operators and petroleum storage tank ven-
dors will be required to show evidence of financial responsibility
for taking corrective action in the amount of $50,000 per occur-
rence and for compensating third parties for bodily injury and
property damage in an amount of $150,000 per occurrence.8 9 Addi-
tionally, the General Assembly adopted a maximum annual aggre-
gate of $200,000 for accidental releases.90
The General Assembly prohibited the discharge of oil into lands
or storm drain systems.9 Before a person stores or handles oil in
the Commonwealth, he must file an oil discharge contingency plan
demonstrating to the SWCB that the applicant can take such steps
as are necessary to protect environmentally sensitive areas and, us-
ing the best available technology, contain and clean up an oil dis-
82. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.15 (Cum. Supp. 1990). For example the SWCB can revoke
the permit if the owner violates any regulation of the Board which is representative of a
pattern of repeated violations which, in the opinion of the Board, demonstrates the owner's
disregard for regulations; if the owner failed to disclose fully all relevant material facts; if
the activity endangers human health and can be regulated to acceptable levels; or if there
exists a material change which necessitates the revocation to protect the environment. Id.
83. Id.
84. See id. §§ 62.1-44.3, -44.5, -44.15, -44.23, -44.32.
85. Id. § 62.1-44.32(b).
86. Id.
87. Id. § 62.1-44.32(c).
88. Id.
89. Id. § 62.1-44.34:12. (These amounts were formerly the minimum amounts).
90. Id.
91. Id. § 62.1-44.34:18. The General Assembly previously prohibited the discharge of oil
into "state waters." Id. § 62.1-44.34:2 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
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charge within the shortest feasible time.9 2 Furthermore, the appli-
cant must meet specified financial responsibility requirements. 9
The liability for property damage is the greater of $10,000,000 or
the amount of the financial responsibility, unless the discharge was
caused by gross negligence or willful misconduct, or the operator
failed to report or cooperate in the cleanup. 4
The civil penalties are specified,9 5 and the criminal penalties are
similar to those enacted for improper disposal of hazardous wastes
and violations of SWCB permits. A knowing violation is a misde-
meanor punishable by up to a year in jail, a fine of up to $100,000,
or both.96 A knowing false statement in any document is a felony
punishable by one to three years in jail, a fine of up to $100,000, or
both. A negligent discharge of oil is a misdemeanor punishable by
up to one year in jail, a fine of $50,000, or both.98 A knowing and
willful discharge of oil is a felony punishable by one to ten years in
jail, a fine of up to $100,000, or both.99 Following a prior felony
conviction for a knowing and willful discharge, any violation of this
chapter is also a felony, punishable by two to ten years in jail, a
fine of up to $200,000, or both.'01
The General Assembly also required the Board of Health to ex-
ercise due diligence to protect the quality of both surface water
and groundwater. 10 The Board of Health was given responsibility
for permitting alternative types of sewage systems, 02 and authority
to develop criteria for determining the ability of alternative on-site
sewage systems. 0 3
The General Assembly clarified an ambiguity arising from the
1989 provisions establishing the Virginia Water Protection Permit
92. Id. § 62.1-44.34:15 (Cur. Supp. 1990).
93. Id. § 62.1-44.34:16.
94. Id. § 62.1-44:18.
95. For failure to obtain approval of an oil discharge contingency plan, $1,000 to $50,000
for the initial violation, and $5,000 per day thereafter; for failure to maintain evidence of
financial responsibility, $1,000 to $100,000 for the initial violation, and $5,000 per day there-
after; for failure to cooperate in containment and cleanup of a discharge, $1,000 to $50,000,
and $10,000 per day thereafter; for discharging oil, up to $100 per gallon. Id. § 62.1-44.34:20.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. § 32.1-164(A) (Cur. Supp. 1990).
102. Id. §§ 32.1-163, -164.
103. Id. § 32.1-164(B)(10).
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("VWPP") which will replace section 401 certification in Virginia.
In 1989, the General Assembly grandfathered withdrawals in exis-
tence on July 1, 1989, or which received section 401 certification
prior to January 1, 1989. However, it was unclear whether those
withdrawals receiving section 401 certification after July 1, 1989,
but before the SWCB's regulations for implementation of the Vir-
ginia permit program will be required to obtain a VWPP. The clar-
ification provides that no VWPP is required if the withdrawal re-
ceived section 401 certification containing minimum instream flow
requirements after July 1, 1989, but prior to the date regulations
implementing this section are effective. 104
B. Administrative Proceedings
The SWCB adopted financial responsibility requirements for Pe-
troleum Underground Storage Tanks ("UST's") on March 19-20,
1990, effective May 9, 1990.105 These follow the technical require-
ments for UST's which went into effect on October 25, 1989.106
Although the state regulations essentially track the federal fi-
nancial responsibility requirements, they differ in several respects.
In Virginia, UST owners are required to demonstrate financial re-
sponsibility of $50,000 per occurrence for taking corrective action
for accidental releases.107 Owners are also required to demonstrate
financial responsibility of $150,000 per occurrence to compensate
third parties for bodily injury and property damage caused by acci-
dentally releases.10 8 These amounts apply regardless of the number
of tanks owned and are substantially lower than the federal re-
quirements. Virginia, however, has established the Virginia Under-
ground Petroleum Storage Tank Fund ("VUPSTF"), which satis-
fies the costs in excess of the above amounts up to one million
dollars per occurrence for taking both corrective action and com-
pensating third parties for bodily injury and property damage."0 9
104. Id. § 62.1-44.15:5 (Cum. Supp. 1990). Unaddressed are those section 101 certifica-
tions received between January 1, 1989 and July 1, 1989, if any, for which no withdrawal
was in existence on July 1, 1989.
105. 6:14 Va. Regs. Reg. 2150 (1990).
106. 5:26 Va. Regs. Reg. 4103-26. (These are discussed in the 1989 survey article, Kings-
ley, supra note 1.)
107. 6:14 Va. Regs. Reg. 2150, 2153, § 4(A)(1) (1990).
108. As a result, Virginia does not violate federal requirements that the Virginia program
be at least as stringent as the federal one. Id. at 2153, § 4(A)(2).
109. Id. at 2161, § 21.
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The fund is also utilized when the owner cannot be identified,
the SWCB determines that immediate action is necessary to pro-
tect human health and the environment, or when the SWCB deter-
mines that the owner is incapable of taking appropriate corrective
action.110
Costs over one million dollars are paid by the federal govern-
ment, which then seeks reimbursement from the owner. The
SWCB may seek reimbursement for amounts expended by the
state fund when the owner has violated substantial environmental
protection rules and regulations, and from any person who is liable
for injuries and damages."1
The Department of Conservation and Recreation has proposed
storm water management regulations 112 which apply to all localities
establishing storm water management programs as well as to every
state agency that, after January 1, 1991, engages in land clearing,
soil movement, or land development." 3 The regulations, whose
purpose is to achieve effective control of precipitation runoff from
land development projects,' 4 specify minimum technical criteria
and administrative procedures for storm water management pro-
grams. 1 5 Activities exempt from these regulations include permit-
ted deep surface mining operations, harvesting of agricultural
crops, single family residences and land development programs
which disturb less than one acre of land.1 6
The Virginia Soil and Water Conservation Board has proposed
revised erosion and sediment control regulations which will repeal
Virginia Regulation 625-01-01.11 The purpose of the proposed reg-
ulations is to establish minimum standards for the control of soil
erosion, sediment, deposition and non-agricultural runoff from
land disturbing activities.""' Land disturbing activities include, but
are not limited to, clearing, grading, excavating, transporting and
filling of land. These minimum standards must be met in local ero-
sion and sediment control programs, and also by state agencies
110. Id.
111. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.34:11(B) (Cum. Supp. 1990).
112. 6:12 Va. Regs. Reg. 1733 (1990).
113. Id. at 1735, § 1.4.
114. Id. at 1734, § 1.3.
115. Id. at 1735, § 2.1.
116. Id. § 1.4(B).
117. 6:14 Va. Regs. Reg. 2102 (1990).
118. Id. at 2104, § 1.3.
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that conduct land disturbing activities.119
The SWCB has proposed water resource regulations which will
establish standards for the Virginia Water Protection Permit
("VWPP"). 120 As discussed previously, VWPP will replace section
401 certification required pursuant to the Federal Clean Water Act
and will be required for the same activities for which section 401
certification is presently required. 2' The only significant difference
between the new VWPP program and the present section 401 cer-
tification is that, unlike section 401 certification, the VWPP is ex-
pressly authorized to contain conditions on water withdrawals.
The SWCB established a very controversial standard for dioxin
in surface water; the ambient concentration cannot exceed 1.2
parts per quadrillion (ppq) based upon a risk level of 10-5 and a
potency of 1.75 x 10(4) (mg/kg-day) _1.122 The standard became
effective on July 18, 1990. The dioxin standard is less stringent
than the EPA criteria for dioxin. This has prompted considerable
criticism and a law suit from environmentalists. 23
C. Judicial Activities
1. Federal Courts
In Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Gwaltney of Smithfield,
Ltd.,24 the Fourth Circuit held that evidence supported the dis-
trict court's finding of "ongoing violations" of defendant's National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit. The
court also held that the Chesapeake Bay Foundation ("CBF") had
standing to request civil penalties for violations of defendant's per-
mit limitations and that the "ongoing violations" presented a live
controversy. The court, however, held that the district court lacked
jurisdiction to impose penalties for the permittee's "wholly past
119. Id. at 2107, §§ 1.9, -.10.
120. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.15:5 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
121. See infra text accompanying note 104.
122. 6:19 Va. Regs. Reg. 3085 (1990).
123. On July 5, 1990, the Environmental Defense Fund filed a petition for appeal of the
dioxin standard, alleging that SWCB failed to incorporate in the standard protection
against short-term health effects, aquatic-life effects, and bioaccumulation of dioxin in fish
tissue. The petition also states that the SWCB adopted a standard that was economically
and technologically feasible and measurable by current analytical methods. Environmental
Defense Fund v. State Water Control Board, No. CH90A00731 (Richmond Cir. Ct. July 5,
1990).
124. 890 F.2d 690 (4th Cir. 1989).
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chlorine violations. 125
CBF brought its original action under the citizens suit provision
of the Federal Clean Water Act.126 CBF sought injunctive relief
and civil penalties alleging that Gwaltney violated the total
Kjeldahl nitrogen ("TKN") and chlorine limitations in its NPDES
permit. Initially, the district court found that CBF had standing to
bring the suit, that the court had subject matter jurisdiction, and
that Gwaltney was liable for its past violations of TKN and chlo-
rine limitations. The district court imposed a civil penalty of
$1,285,322 with interest, of which $289,822 was for violations of
Gwaltneys total TKN limit, and $995,500 was for violations of its
chlorine limit.127
Gwaltney appealed the decision to the Fourth Circuit which af-
firmed the district court's finding that section 1365 of the Clean
Water Act conferred jurisdiction for citizens suits based wholly on
past violations. The United States Supreme Court granted certiori
on the issue of jurisdiction and held that section 1365 does not
permit citizen suits for "wholly past violations." 28 The Supreme
Court remanded the case to the Fourth Circuit to consider whether
CBF had made a good faith allegation of "ongoing violations,"
holding that such would be sufficient to establish subject matter
jurisdiction. 2 9 The Fourth Circuit in turn remanded the case to
the district court for further findings as to whether CBF proved an"ongoing violation" at trial. The district court found that CBF had
proved "ongoing violations" and reinstated its original judgment of
$1,285,322 in civil penalties. 3 0 Gwaltney appealed the decision al-
leging that there was insufficient evidence to support the decision
of "ongoing violations," that CBF lacked standing and that the
case was moot. Gwaltney further claimed that the court erred in
reinstating penalties for chlorine as well as TKN violations.13'
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that although Gwaltney was
in compliance with both TKN and chlorine limitations at the time
of suit, an "ongoing violation" could also be found if "at the time
suit was brought there was a reasonable likelihood that this past
125. Id. at 692.
126. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988).
127. Gwaltney, 890 F.2d at 692.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 692-93.
131. Id. at 693.
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polluter would continue to pollute in the future."132 The Fourth
Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that there was suffi-
cient likelihood of future violations of the TKN limitations, and
that there was an "ongoing violation" of TKN levels. The court,
however, found that it was "absolutely clear" that there were no
ongoing chlorine violations at the time the suit was brought. 133
The Fourth Circuit rejected Gwaltney's assertion that CBF
lacked standing because the relief it requested-civil penal-
ties-could not redress CBF's injury. The court stated that pay-
ments of civil penalties are causally related to a citizen-plaintiff's
injury and are therefore likely to address the injury.I3 4
Finally, in addressing the mootness issue, the court held that the
case was not moot merely because the litigation related to penal-
ties imposed for past violations and the primary subject matter ju-
risdiction was based on alleged continuing violations. According to
the court, the penalty factor keeps controversies between plaintiffs
and defendants alive in a citizen suit even though defendant has
come into compliance and even though the ultimate judicial rem-
edy is imposition of civil penalties assessed for past acts of
pollution.135
The court, however, vacated the district court's imposition of
civil penalties for chlorine violations because there was no evidence
of "ongoing violations" of chlorine limitations. Because the court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction with respect to the chlorine vio-
lations, the court considered it inappropriate to impose penalties
for past chlorine violations., 6
In Westvaco Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 37 the
Fourth Circuit dismissed Westvaco's petitions for review of an
EPA decision proposing partial disapproval of lists of "impaired
waters" submitted by Virginia and Maryland pursuant to 33
U.S.C. § 1314(1)138 holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to re-
view EPA's decision. 139 EPA preliminarily disapproved Maryland's
"B" and "C" lists and Individual Control Strategy ("ICS") because
132. Id. at 695.
133. Id. at 697.
134. Id. at 695.
135. Id. at 696.
136. Id. at 698.
137. 899 F.2d 1383 (4th Cir. 1990).
138. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(1) (1988).
139. Westvaco, 899 F.2d at 1389.
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Maryland did not include the north branch of the Potomac River
on its "B" List and Westvaco's Luke Mill on its "C" List, and be-
cause it failed to submit an ICS for that point source of dioxin.
EPA preliminarily disapproved Virginia's "B" and "C" lists and
ICS because Virginia did not include the Jackson River on its "B"
list, and Westvaco's Covington Mill on its "C" list, and because it
did not submit an ICS for that point source of dioxin.140
Westvaco petitioned for review challenging EPA's preliminary
disapprovals of Maryland and Virginia's lists which Westvaco con-
tended might affect its Luke and Covington Mills. Westvaco as-
serted that EPA's disapproval constituted a "reviewable agency ac-
tion" under 33 U.S.C. §§ 1369(b)(1)(D) and 1369(b)(1)(E).' 4'
Westvaco contended that EPA's disapproval constituted review-
able agency action for the following reasons: (1) the disapproval
constituted an "implicit determination" of general failure to per-
form the obligation to protect water quality imposed by 33 U.S.C.
§ 1312(a); (2) disapproval constituted a "determination" that the
affected states' water quality standards are inadequate, which is in
turn a determination as to a state program submitted under 33
U.S.C. 1342(b)(3); (3) the disapproval amounted to the promulga-
tion of enforceable remedial measures for the two mills; and (4)
EPA's disapproval was the "promulgation of effluent
limitations.' ' 42
The court rejected all of these arguments, holding that it lacked
jurisdiction to review EPA's decision. According to the court,
Westvaco must await final EPA disapproval of the "B" and "C"
lists.143
In State of North Carolina v. Hudson, 44 North Carolina, a river
basin association, and several counties in Virginia and North Caro-
lina challenged the issuance of a permit by the Army Corps of En-
gineers (the "Army Corps") to the City of Virginia Beach to con-
struct a water pipeline. On further appeal, the district court
upheld the issuance of the permit finding that the Army Corps did
140. Id. at 1386.
141. 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(D) gives the court jurisdiction to review agency action "in
making any determination as to a State program under 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d). 33 U.S.C. §
1369(b)(1)(E) gives the court jurisdiction to review agency action in approving or promul-
gating any effluent limitations or other limitations under the Federal Clean Water Act.
142. Westvaco, 899 F.2d at 1387-89.
143. Id. at 1389.
144. 731 F. Supp. 1261 (E.D.N.C. 1990).
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not act "arbitrarily or capriciously" in concluding that an Environ-
mental Impact Statement ("EIS") was not necessary.145
The City of Virginia Beach had sought permission from the
Army Corps to construct a sixty-inch pipeline across southern Vir-
ginia from Lake Gaston to Virginia Beach for the purpose of meet-
ing its municipal water supply needs. After the Army Corps de-
cided to issue the permit, the above-mentioned groups brought suit
requesting judicial review of the Army Corps' decision. After the
court reviewed the decision of the Army Corps pursuant to the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, 4 ' it remanded the case to the Corps,
instructing the Corps to: (1) make an independent assessment of
the effect of the project on striped bass to determine whether an
EIS is required; and (2) to make a determination as to the extent
of Virginia Beach's water needs. 4 '
At issue on further appeal was whether the Army Corps properly
considered the effect on striped bass and Virginia Beach's water
needs in compliance with NEPA in reaching its decision to ap-
prove the permit. The court stated that in reviewing whether the
Army Corps decision should be upheld, the reviewing court shall:
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclu-
sions found to be-
(a) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise
not in accordance with law;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law.148
The court further stated that in applying the "arbitrary and capri-
cious" standard to NEPA determinations, the court must "deter-
mine whether the agency, in its conclusions, made a good faith
judgment after considering all relevant factors, including possible
alternatives or mitigative measures. 4 '
Finding that the Army Corps had taken a "hard look" at the
environmental consequences, including the effect on striped bass
145. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires federal agencies to prepare
an Environmental Impact Statement for every major federal action significantly effecting
the quality of the human environment. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1988).
146. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988).
147. Hudson, 731 F. Supp. at 1262.
148. Id. at 1268 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a)(D)).
149. Id.
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and Virginia Beach's water needs, the district court held that the
Army Corps had complied with the NEPA requirements. 50
In Fiscella & Fiscella v. United States,'5' the federal district
court dismissed a land developer's suit to enjoin the Army Corps
from asserting jurisdiction, by way of a cease-and-desist order, over
a development site containing wetlands. The developer alleged
that the court had jurisdiction to enjoin the order pursuant to the
Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 5 2 and the federal question
statute. 53
In rejecting the land developer's petition to enjoin the Corps'
cease-and-desist order, the court found that the enforcement pro-
visions of the Federal Clean Water Act ("FCWA")154 supple-
mented by the citizens-suit provision of the FCWA 5 5 do not pro-
vide a remedy to a private party plaintiff. The court also rejected
plaintiff's assertion that the court had jurisdiction pursuant to 33
U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2), which provides a cause of action against EPA
where there is an alleged failure of EPA to perform a duty under
33 U.S.C. § 1313(d). Finally, the court .rejected plaintiff's assertion
that the "savings clause" of 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) 15 coupled with the
federal question statute provides an independent remedy for in-
jured parties. Accordingly, the court concluded that the FCWA did
not provide plaintiffs with a cause of action nor did it afford plain-
tiffs an implied right of action. 57
Alternately, the court found that plaintiffs' attempt to enjoin the
Army Corps from asserting jurisdiction constituted pre-enforce-
ment review which encroached on the duties and expertise of the
Army Corps in a matter inconsistent with the enforcement scheme
of the FCWA. 5 8 Furthermore, the court held that plaintiffs at-
tempt to seek pre-enforcement review "constitutes an end-run
around the Administrative Procedures Act."'5
150. Id. at 1273.
151. 717 F. Supp. 1143 (E.D. Va. 1989).
152. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 (1988).
153. 28 U.S.C. § 1331; Fiscella, 717 F. Supp. at 1144-45.
154. 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1988).
155. 33 U.S.C. § 1365.
156. Id. § 1365(e) states that, "Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any
person. . may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any effluent
standard or limitation or to seek any other relief. . .
157. Fiscella, 717 F. Supp. at 1146.
158. Id. at 1146-47.
159. Id. at 1147.
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In United States v. Hobbs160 the federal district court in a mem-
orandum opinion held that 28 U.S.C. § 2462161 was the proper stat-
ute of limitations in an action for civil penalties and injunctive re-
lief brought by the Army Corps.16 2 The Army Corps sought
injunctive relief and civil penalties against defendants for placing
fill materials into the waters of the United States without ob-
taining a permit from the Army Corps. 6 '
Defendants asserted that the federal five year statute of limita-
tions of 28 U.S.C. § 2462 was only applicable if the court deter-
mined that Virginia's one-year statute of limitations did not ap-
ply.'6 4 The court rejected defendants argument stating that the
property inquiry is not whether the Virginia's one-year statute of
limitations is applicable, but instead, which statute of limitations
is the most appropriate. 65 Finding that the applicable federal stat-
ute exists and that the applications of Virginia's one-year statute
of limitations would frustrate national policy, the court held that
the federal five-year statute was the most appropriate limitations
period to be applied with respect to the civil penalties. 6
The court further held that the violations accrued when they
were reported to EPA. Thus, the statute of limitations did not be-
gin to run until a violation was first reported, and therefore plain-
tiff's action for civil penalties was not time-barred. The court ex-
pressly rejected defendants assertion that the violations first
accrued when they actually occurred. 6 '
With respect to injunctive relief, the court found that neither
statute of limitations applied and that such action could only be
time-barred by the doctrine of laches. 6 8 Finding no evidence in the
record of lack of diligence by the plaintiff in commencing the ac-
tion, the court held that the claim for injunctive relief was not
160. 736 F. Supp. 1406 (E.D. Va. 1990).
161. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1988) provides: "Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress,
an action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture,
pecuniary or otherwise, shall not be entertained unless commenced within five years from
the date when the claim first accrued ....
162. The FCWA does not have a statute of limitations.
163. Hobbs, 736 F. Supp. at 1406.
164. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-248 (Repl. Vol. 1977) provides: "Every personal action, for
which no limitation is otherwise prescribed, shall be brought within one year after the right
to bring such action has accrued."
165. Hobbs, 736 F. Supp. at 1409.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1409-10.
168. Id. at 1410.
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barred by the doctrine of laches.10
2. Virginia State Courts
In addition to federal court decisions, several state court cases in
the past year addressed important environmental issues. The Su-
preme Court of Virginia in Zapulla v. Crown,1 70 ruled that the Vir-
ginia Marine Resources Commission ("VMRC") lacked authority
to determine rights of landowners who claimed riparian rights in
waters of a creek, and thus the VMRC's issuance of a permit for
additional marina construction was not res judicata as to a subse-
quent suit brought in equity for a determination of riparian rights.
Therefore, the supreme court held that plaintiff's failure to appeal
the VMRC's decision did not give rise to the defense of laches.17
In addition, the court held that the VMRC was not a necessary
party in the suit involving a dispute between a marina owner and
an adjoining landowner regarding the riparian rights of the waters
of a creek.1 72
Subsequent to the VMRC's decision to issue a marina owner a
permit for additional construction, an adjoining landowner brought
a bill in equity for a declaratory judgment as to the extent of right
of enjoyment along the creek's line of navigability and an alloca-
tion of his proper share of the underwater flats between the line
and shoreline. The Circuit Court of Middlesex County sustained
the marina owner's demurrer and motion to dismiss on grounds
that no appeal had been taken from the VMRC's decision within
the time required and that the VMRC's decision was res judicata
with respect to riparian rights. The adjoining landowner
appealed." 3
On appeal, the marina owner asserted that the VMRC's decision
to issue a permit for construction to the marina was res judicata
with respect to the issues raised in the plaintiff's bill of complaint
and that because no appeal was taken from the VMRC's decision,
it was final and not subject to collateral attack.
In reversing the circuit court's dismissal of plaintiff's bill of com-
plaint, the court reasoned that the VMRC's issuance of a permit
169. Id.
170. - Va. -, 391 S.E.2d 65 (1990).
171. Id. at -, 391 S.E.2d at 68.
172. Id.
173. Id. at -, 391 S.E.2d at 66.
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for construction solely determines the rights of an applicant vis-a-
vis the Commonwealth and the public, and a court of equity "has
sole jurisdiction to resolve conflicting private riparian claims.174
Because the VMRC lacked authority to determine riparian
rights, its action in granting a permit had no res judicata effect on
the case before the court and did not confer any vested rights on
the marina owner vis-a-vis other property owners. The Supreme
Court further reasoned that because the VMRC decision did not
have any effect on private rights, the complainants failure to ap-
peal the decision under the Administrative Process Act did not
give rise to the defense of laches and the VMRC is neither a neces-
sary nor a proper party to the action.7 5
The Court of Appeals of Virginia in State Water Control Board
v. Appalachian Power 76 affirmed the trial court's invalidation of
the State Water Control Board's ("SWCB") 1987 chlorine water
quality standards and designation of outstanding resource wa-
ters.'77 In 1987, as part of its triennial review,'78 the SWCB had
attempted to amend its chlorine standard to prohibit the use of
chlorine or other halogen compounds by any facility that dis-
charges at least 20,000 gallons of effluent per day into state waters
inhabited by endangered or threatened species of aquatic life, and
to designate a 121 mile section of the Clinch River as an essential
or critical habitat for several species. Appalachian Power Company
("APCO"), which operates a steam electric power plant within the
designated area of the Clinch River, appealed the adoption of the
standards to the Circuit Court of Roanoke pursuant to sections
62.1-44.24 and 9-6.14:16 of the Code. The circuit court ruled that
the standards were invalid because the SWCB failed to hold an
evidential hearing prior to amending the water quality standards
as required by section 9-6.14:8 of the Code.'7
The SWCB appealed the decision. The SWCB asserted that it
had satisfied the statutory requirement for an evidential hearing
by providing APCO an opportunity to request an evidential hear-
174. Id. at -, 391 S.E.2d at 67.
175. Id. at -, 391 S.E.2d at 68.
176. 9 Va. App. 254, 386 S.E.2d 633 (1989).
177. Id. The regulations were declared invalid pursuant to VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:19, VR
325-01-1, § 13 (1987) and VR 680-21-07.2 (1987).
178. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.15(3a) (Repl. Vol. 1987) mandates that the SWCB conduct a
triennial review of its water quality standards and amend them where necessary to fulfill its
duty to protect and restore the state's waters.
179. State Water Control Board, 9 Va. App. at 256-58, 386 S.E.2d at 634-35.
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ing. Alternatively, SWCB contended that APCO was not harmed
by the failure of the SWCB to hold the hearing.'
The Court of Appeals of Virginia, however, found that the
SWCB's basic law, section 62.1-44.15(3a) of the Code, specifically
states that the SWCB shall hold hearings before it promulgates its
water standards, and further, that the Administrative Process Act
defines "hearing" as "(i) opportunity for private parties to submit
factual proofs in formal proceedings as provided as in § 9-6.14:8 of
this chapter in connection with the making of regulations ... ."181
Thus, the court concluded that the SWCB's basic law in conjunc-
tion with the Administrative Process Act required the SWCB to
conduct a formal hearing to receive probative evidence prior to the
adoption of new water quality standards."8 2 The court noted that
when an agency fails to conform to the required statutory author-
ity when enacting its regulations, the affected party may success-
fully challenge the regulations without having to show that it was
harmed by the agency's failure to comply with the law.183
Some of the most publicized proceedings of the year involved
Avtex Fibers, which allegedly discharged Polychlornated Biphenyls
("PCB's") into the Shenandoah River. The Commonwealth filed
temporary restraining orders in September and October of 1989 re-
sulting in the issuance of two orders restricting Avtex's discharges
by the Circuit Court of Richmond. Following issuance of these or-
ders, the SWCB convened a formal hearing and decided to revoke
Avtex's National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
("NPDES") permit. In Commonwealth v. Avtex Fibers,184 the Cir-
cuit Court of Richmond issued orders on September 27, 1989 and
October 13, 1989 which significantly restricted Avtex Fibers' opera-
tions. The Commonwealth issued the orders in response to evi-
dence of continued discharges of PCB's into the Shenandoah
River.'8 5 The initial order enjoined Avtex from using its storm
water drainage system until it was cleaned and cleared of any PCB
contamination. The injunction also required Avtex to conduct
daily monitoring for PCB's at its stormwater drainage system and
180. Id. at 256, 386 S.E.2d at 634.
181. Id. at 260, 386 S.E.2d at 636 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:4(E) (Cur. Supp.
1990)).
182. Id. at 261, 386 S.E.2d at 636.
183. Id. at 262, 386 S.E.2d at 637.
184. No. 8233 (Richmond Cir. Ct. Sept. 27, Oct. 13, 1989).
185. Id. (Oct. 13, 1989).
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to initiate monitoring for PCB's at its wastewater treatment sys-
tem discharge. 186
On October 13, 1989, finding that there was ample evidence that
Avtex had violated its NPDES permit, the court entered a second
order enjoining all discharges from Avtex's wastewater treatment
outfall.187 The court, however, stated that the injunction would be
suspended if Avtex posted a $150,000 bond or other surety and
there was no discharge of PCB's into the Shenandoah River from
its storm water and waste water treatment outfalls. The court de-
nied the Commonwealth's request to enjoin Avtex's operations
stating that it was inappropriate for the court to punish or give
final relief at the preliminary injunction stage. 88
On October 30th, with the court injunctions still in effect, the
SWCB convened a formal hearing for the purpose of considering
whether to revoke Avtex's NPDES permit.189 At the hearing, the
Commonwealth made a summary presentation and proposed con-
clusions of law. Among the proposed conclusions were the follow-
ing: (1) that Avtex had caused or permitted discharges of PCB's to
state waters in violation of its NPDES permit; (2) that despite
knowledge of the discharges dating back to 1985 and potential dis-
charges dating back to 1983, Avtex failed to take all feasible steps
to minimize the adverse impact to state waters resulting from its
noncompliance with the'permit; and (3) that Avtex had failed to
timely perform and report the monitoring necessary to determine
the nature and impact of the noncomplying discharge of PCB's. °90
The Board reconvened on November 9, 1989, and voted to re-
voke Avtex's NPDES permit. The Board found that the evidence
of discharges of PCB's into the Shenandoah River combined with
Avtex's failure to properly mitigate, report and monitor its water
discharges violated the terms of the NPDES permit, section 1.5 of
the permit regulations and section 6.14(c) of the Board's regula-
tions thereby giving the SWCB cause to revoke the permit pursu-
ant to Va. Code § 62.1-44.15(5) and section 5.1(D) of the SWCB
regulations. The revocation of its NPDES permit forced Avtex to
186. Id. (Sept. 27, 1989).
187. Id. (Oct. 13, 1989).
188. Id.
189. Avtex had been issued a NPDES permit for its point source discharges from its
storm water and waste water treatment outfalls into the Shenandoah River.
190. HEARING BEFORE THE STATE WATER CONTROL BOARD; PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW (Oct. 30-31, 1989).
[Vol. 24:583
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
shut down its operations.'91
The circuit court in Environmental Defense Fund v. Virginia
State Water Control Board"2 ruled that the Environmental De-
fense Fund ("EDF") did not have standing under the State Water
Control Law or the Administrative Process Act to appeal a deci-
sion of the SWCB. 19 3 Rocco Farm Foods had petitioned the SWCB
and was issued, after public hearings, an amended NPDES permit
which provided for flow tier limitations. EDF, having participated
in these public hearings, appealed the SWCB's decision to reissue
and modify the Rocco permit. Also, EDF in a separate cause of
action appealed the SWCB's decision to deny EDF's request for
participation in a formal adjudicative-type hearing in connection
with the decision to reissue Rocco's permit. At issue was whether
EDF had standing to appeal either case.9
The Circuit Court of Richmond noted that the right to appeal
may be exercised under both section 62.1-44.29 of the Code 95 and
section 9-6.14:16 of the Virginia Administrative Process Act
("VAPA")'98 because section 62.1-44.29 does not specifically ex-
clude a VAPA appeal. 97 The court stated that EDF was entitled to
appeal if it could establish standing on any one of the following
grounds: (1) as "an owner aggrieved" pursuant to section 62.1-
44.29; (2) as a "person affected" by and claiming unlawfulness of
any regulation'98 or (3) as a "party aggrieved" by and claiming un-
lawfulness of a case decision. 199
The court rejected EDF's standing claim under all three theories
of liability. The court found that EDF was not "an owner ag-
grieved" because it was not subject to the SWCB's power and ju-
risdiction."' The court also found that EDF, under the second the-
ory, was not a person affected by and claiming the unlawfulness of
a regulation. EDF had argued that a staff memorandum entitled
"Flow Trend VPDES Limits" used by the staff in drafting modifi-
191. HEARINGS BEFORE THE STATE WATER CONTROL BOARD FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLU-
SIONS OF LAW (Nov. 9, 1989).
192. Nos. N-7848, N-8078-3 (Rfichmond Cir. Ct. Apr. 25, 1990).
193. Id. slip op. at 2.
194. Id. at 2-3.
195. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.29 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
196. Id. § 9-6.14:16 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
197. EDF, Nos. N-7848-3, N-8078-3, slip op. at 3.
198. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:16 (Supp. 1990).
199. Id. § 9-6.14:16(A).
200. EDF, Nos. N-7848-3, N-8078-3, slip op. at 4.
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cations to permits was an unlawful regulation which affected EDF.
The court rejected this assertion and found that the memorandum
was not a "regulation" as used in section 9-6.14:16, noting that it
was not promulgated by nor did it bind the Board in considering
whether to or not to issue the amended permit.201 Finally the court
found that EDF was not a "party aggrieved" by a case decision
pursuant to section 9-6.14:16A. The court stated that "aggrieved
parties" includes only the applicant or permittee and not members
of the public, even if they are riparian owners of the stream in
question who appear in connection with a permit application.20 2
The court further held that even if individual members of EDF
could show that they were "aggrieved" by the SWCB's decisions as
individuals, EDF did not have standing to appeal the decision on
behalf of them in a representative capacity. According to the court,
only if EDF was directly aggrieved by a board action would it have
standing as a separate entity to appeal the decision.20 3
In South Wales Utility, Inc. v. State Water Control Board,204
the court gave summary judgment to plaintiffs holding that pend-
ing land use litigation should not prevent the SWCB from acting
on a completed permit application. South Wales had applied for a
VPDES permit for its proposed sewage treatment plant to the
SWCB. The SWCB denied the permit until resolution of litigation
in the Circuit Court of Culpeper regarding whether plaintiff's pro-
posed sewage treatment plant complied with Culpeper County
land use ordinances and whether the certification of compliance
with local land use ordinances was sufficient. 05
The court found that under section 62-1-44.19(2) of the Code,
once the SWCB had determined that the permit application was
complete, the SWCB should have acted on the application. The
court noted that the SWCB could have chosen to delay determin-
ing that the application was complete until the litigation was con-
cluded in the trial court thereby allowing the SWCB to delay act-
ing on the permit. The SWCB, however, admitted in its answer to
South Wales' petition for appeal that it deemed South Wales' ap-
plication complete. Therefore, SWCB was required to decide on
201. Id.
202. Id. at 5.
203. Id. at 5-6.
204. No. 161-C-89 (Culpeper County Cir. Ct. Mar. 30, 1980).
205, Id., slip op. at 2.
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the merits whether to approve the application.20 6
On remand, the court ordered the SWCB to decide whether to
issue the permit based on South Wales' prior application, supple-
mented by additional information or review as needed. The court
denied South Wales' request that the court order the SWCB to
issue the permit stating that the SWCB had never made a finding
as to whether the permit should be issued.20 7
V. ENVIRONMENTALLY SENSITIVE AREAS
A. Legislation
The General Assembly set the civil charges that the Marine Re-
sources Commission may order at a maximum of $10,000, and set
the civil penalty a circuit court may assess at $25,000 for any viola-
tion of title 62.1 of the Code, and chapter I (Water Courses Gener-
ally)208 of chapter 2.1 (Wetlands),20 9 or of chapter 2.2 (Coastal Pri-
mary Sand Dunes),210 all of title 62.1.
The General Assembly prohibited oil drilling in the Chesapeake
Bay, in any designated Resource Protection Areas, within five hun-
dred feet from the shoreline or any tributaries, or from the low
water mark of the Atlantic Ocean seaward three miles, until July 1,
1992.211 An environmental impact assessment is required before
any permit is granted for drilling in these areas of Tidewater Vir-
ginia where the two year moratorium is not in effect.2 12
The penalties for taking endangered or threatened species were
expanded to include penalties for taking those species which Vir-
ginia classifies as endangered or threatened under section 29.1-
566.213 The classification of insects was transferred from the Board
of Game and Inland Fisheries to the Board of Agriculture and
Consumer Services.2"4 Threatened species were excluded from the
definition of nuisance species.215
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-9.1 (Cur. Supp. 1990).
209. Id. § 62.1-13.18:2.
210. Id. § 62.1-13.27:1.
211. Id. §§ 62.1-195.1 to -195.2.
212. Id. § 62.1-195.1.
213. Id. § 29.1-567 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
214. Id. § 3.1-1025 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
215. Id. § 29.1-100.
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The General Assembly extended to counties, cities or towns the
right to agree with a person to use his land for public recreational
uses, and required that the person be held harmless from all liabil-
ity for any claims arising from the use of his land.21
The time of maturity for trees was extended from ten to twenty
years for purposes of the minimum tree cover requirement in sub-
division or development site plans.217 The ability to regulate land-
disturbing activities related to single-family residences was ex-
tended to cities and counties contiguous to counties with a county
executive form of government.21 8
A twenty-five percent tax credit was given for the purchase of
advanced technology pesticide and fertilizer application
equipment. 19
For repair or replacement of roofing, floorcovering, or siding
which may contain asbestos, the General Assembly authorized an
RFS inspector to certify that no asbestos is present.2 0 The Depart-
ment of Commerce must promulgate training requirements by Jan-
uary 1, 1991.221 Similarly, the Department must implement a plan
for the issuance of asbestos project monitor's licenses by January1, 1991.222
B. Administrative Proceedings
The Chesapeake Bay Preservation Area Designation and Man-
agement Regulations adopted on September 20, 1989 became effec-
tive on October 1, 1989.22 The purpose of these regulations is to
protect and improve the water quality of the Chesapeake Bay
through both local and state efforts. The regulations require local
governments in Tidewater Virginia to adopt, through zoning and
subdivision ordinances, more stringent criteria for land use and de-
velopment in specifically designated areas, called Chesapeake Bay
Preservation Areas ("CBPA's").224 These areas are divided into
216. Id. § 29.1-509(E).
217. Id. § 15.1-14.2(B) (Supp. 1990).
218. Id. § 10.1-560(10) (Supp. 1990).
219. Id. § 58.1-337(A) (Cum. Supp. 1990).
220. Id. §§ 36-99.7(B)(2), 54.1-501 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
221. Id. § 54.1-501(A)(3).
222. Id. § 54.1-502(A).
223. 6:1 Va. Regs. Reg. 11 (1989).
224. Id. at 14, § 3.1.
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two categories: Resource Protection Areas,220 which constitute
more sensitive areas closer to the shore, and Resource Manage-
ment Areas,226 which are less sensitive upland areas that could po-
tentially degrade water quality. Local governments are also given
the option to identify as overlay "Intensely Developed Areas, 2 27
which are allowed certain exemptions from these criteria.
The Act sets performance criteria which outline the restrictions
on land use within the above designated areas. These criteiia are
divided into two types: general criteria that apply in all CBPA's,228
and more stringent criteria that only apply in the Resource Protec-
tion Areas. 29 Included in this section are exemptions and excep-
tions to these criteria.230
The regulations also provide for local program development to
show compliance with these measures in two steps to be completed
in a twelve and a twenty-four month period. Within a year of the
regulations' promulgation, Tidewater localities must designate
CBPAs within their boundaries;231 by the second year, these same
localities must incorporate provisions at least as stringent as those
outlined in the land use and development criteria mentioned
above. 32 Both of these steps are subject to the approval at the
state level by the Chesapeake Bay Assistance Board, a citizen
board, which directs the work of the Chesapeake Bay Local Assis-
tance Department. 33
The final part of the regulations concern enforcement and estab-
lish administrative and legal procedures to secure compliance with
the Act by local governments.23 4
225. Id. § 3.2
226. Id. at 15, § 3.3.
227. Id. § 3.4.
228. Id. at 16, § 4.2.
229. Id. at 17, § 4.3.
230. Id. at 19, § 4.4.
231. Id. at 21, § 5.5(C).
232. Id. at 22, § 5.6.
233. Id. at 21-23, §§ 5.5(B) and 5.6(F).
234. Id. at 24, § 6.1.
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